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1 December 1978

STAT	MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DCI	
STAT	FROM: Security Advisor Working Group	
i	SUBJECT: Revision of Concept	STAT
	1. As we approach implementation of the revision of our compartmentation programs, I am concerned that a significant volume of formerly compartmented intelligence will, under this concept, become potentially available to all holders of SECRET or TOP SECRET clearances. The personnel security practices on which these clearances are granted permits a	25X1
25X1	These procedures are insufficient to permit even a positive identification of the individual and they are generally considered as undesirable as a personnel security criteria for granting access to sensitive foreign intelligence.	•
	2. These procedures are based on provisions of E.O. 10450, of April 27, 1953, as amended. That Order is currently under review. The current draft of the review provides that the Order shall not apply to the DCI or the organizations constituting the Intelligence Community.	

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- 3. E.O. 12036, U.S. Intelligence Activities, offers the means to fill this potential void through its charge to the DCI of the responsibility to ensure the establishment by the Intelligence Community of common security and access standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence systems, information and product.
- 4. As an exercise in common with implementing revisions of our compartmentation programs, I suggest that the Group undertake a review of security and access standards for both the large volume of non-compartmented and the comparatively small volume of compartmented foreign intelligence. The goal of the review would be to establish standards for access to non-compartmented foreign intelligence higher than now employed in granting SECRET and TOP SECRET clearances and to include a requirement of execution of a secrecy agreement as a condition precedent to access. A secondary goal would be a review of DCID 1/14 standards for access to compartmented intelligence.
- 5. These opinions and beliefs have not been coordinated with security elements throughout the Community. They do, however, represent the feelings of the Director of Security, CIA.

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